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The New Plague: False Claims Liability
Based on Inequitable Conduct During
Patent Prosecution
Gregory Michael, William Newsom, and Matthew Avery*
In January 2009, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals filed a first-of-itskind qui tam suit on behalf of the federal government and several states
alleging that its competitor, Aventis Pharma, violated the Federal False
Claims Act (“FCA”) when it fraudulently acquired a patent and then
overcharged the government for its patented drug. By utilizing a fraudulently acquired patent to elevate the price of Lovenox, a drug for treating
deep-vein thrombosis, Amphastar alleged that Aventis had overcharged
the government for every Lovenox pill purchased with government funds,
including all prescriptions funded in part by Medicare or other federal
insurance programs. The FCA provides a means for litigants to pursue
recovery for fraud perpetrated against the federal government. In its
complaint, Amphastar alleged that Aventis obtained its patent by engaging in inequitable conduct during prosecution of its patent application
before the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Our analysis of
FCA claims based on this novel inequitable-conduct theory concludes
that a patentee could be liable for violating the False Claims Act if (1)
the government purchased the patented product, (2) the prices of that
product were in fact elevated because of the exclusivity provided by the
fraudulently obtained patent, and (3) the patentee knew, deliberately
ignored, or showed reckless disregard in deciding to submit a claim for
payment from the government at this elevated price. If the court in Amphastar finds Aventis liable under this novel theory, the consequences
*
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could be far-reaching. Given the nature of modern patent litigation, with
inequitable conduct defenses being nearly ubiquitous, such a ruling could
expose nearly every patent holder that does business with the federal government to possible liability under the FCA.
This Article discusses the implications of bringing FCA claims based
on an inequitable-conduct theory, explores the rationale behind invoking
the FCA in this context, and suggests precautions that practitioners can
take in such lawsuits. It proposes a variety of reforms to the False Claims
Act to check the problems caused by these types of FCA claims. These
proposals may become more relevant after the resolution of the Amphastar case if the court validates Amphastar’s novel theory and others follow suit in bringing FCA claims against pharmaceutical patent holders.
I have based the [qui tam provision of the False
Claims Act] upon the old-fashioned idea of holding
out a temptation, and “setting a rogue to catch a rogue,” which is the safest and most expeditious way I
have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.
–U.S. Senator Jacob M. Howard1
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INTRODUCTION
In January 2009, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals filed a lawsuit
under the Federal False Claims Act (“FCA”) alleging that its
competitor Aventis Pharma fraudulently inflated the price of Lovenox (enoxaparin), a patented drug for treating deep-vein thrombosis, and overcharged the federal government and various state
governments by making claims for payment through Medicare and
state Medicaid systems.2 The FCA provides a means for both private litigants and the Department of Justice to pursue recovery for
fraud perpetrated against the federal government.3 Amphastar’s
FCA suit was based on the novel theory that Aventis defrauded the
government when it fraudulently acquired its patent by engaging in
inequitable conduct while prosecuting its patent application before
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”).4
Aventis’s fraudulent acquisition of this patent allowed it to mono2

Memorandum and Order Re: Amended Complaint at 2, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals
Inc., v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023, (C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2013).
3
See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012).
4
Memorandum and Order, supra note 2, at 2.
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polize Lovenox sales, elevate the price of the drug, and illegally
overcharge the government.5 This lawsuit is currently being litigated and it is unclear whether Amphastar’s theory of FCA liability
based on inequitable conduct is even valid, let alone whether Amphastar will prevail.6
Under the patent law doctrine of inequitable conduct, a patent
can be held unenforceable if a court finds that the patentee obtained the patent by engaging in improper conduct before the
USPTO.7 Once referred to as an “absolute plague” on the patent
system by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, inequitable
conduct is routinely asserted by defendants in patent cases.8 Common examples of inequitable conduct include making false statements to the patent office or intentionally withholding material information during prosecution.9 Where a patentee engages in inequitable conduct and then sells its patented product to the government (or seeks reimbursement through programs such as Medicare), it can be argued that the improperly obtained patent allowed
the patentee to sell its product at fraudulently inflated prices, thereby violating the FCA by submitting a false claim for payment.10
Consequently, if Amphastar’s theory prevails, it could expose
5

Id.
The parties are currently disputing the sufficiency of Amphastar’s allegations that
Aventis submitted a fraudulent claim, and whether the allegations are supportable by
evidence.
7
See, e.g., Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2011).
8
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has
become an absolute plague.”); Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (“Left unfettered, the
inequitable conduct doctrine has plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent
system.”). Note, however, that the en banc court in Therasense heightened the standard
for finding inequitable conduct, as discussed in more detail in Part II, infra.
9
See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“To prove inequitable conduct in the prosecution of a patent, [the
defendant] must have provided evidence of affirmative misrepresentations of a material
fact, failure to disclose material information, or submission of false material information,
coupled with an intent to deceive.” (quoting Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. McGraw, Inc., 149 F.3d
1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
10
See, e.g., Delia A. Stubbs, Court Rules in Novel False Claims Act Case Where One
Pharmaceutical Company Sues Another, FDA L. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2013, 6:35 PM),
http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2013/04/court-rules-innovel-false-claims-act-case-where-one-pharmaceutical-company-sues-another.html.
6
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nearly every patent holder that does business with the federal government to possible liability under the FCA and create a new plague on the patent system.
This Article explores the implications of bringing FCA claims
based on this novel theory of inequitable conduct. Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of federal and state false claims laws.
In addition to claims by competitors like those in the Amphastar v.
Aventis case, this theory provides an avenue for whistleblowers to
profit from their knowledge of fraudulent conduct by serving as a
relator in a false claims qui tam action.11 Alternatively, a defendant
in a patent infringement suit may gain access to confidential information that could invalidate the patent and be used as the basis for
a qui tam action. Part II provides an overview of the current state of
the doctrine of inequitable conduct, which requires a showing that
the patent holder’s conduct was both material to patentability and
done with the specific intent to deceive the patent office. Part III
discusses the Amphastar v. Aventis case, and then analyzes the suitability and practicability of the inequitable-conduct-based theory
of false-claims liability. Part IV provides strategic considerations
for practitioners who are attempting to mitigate this type of falseclaims liability. Finally, Part V proposes modifications to the current regulatory regime to resolve problems with FCA claims
brought under a theory of inequitable conduct.
I. FEDERAL AND STATE FALSE CLAIMS
The Federal False Claims Act allows for both the Department
of Justice and private whistleblowers, referred to as relators, to
pursue actions against entities and individuals that have fraudulently claimed government funds.12 While originally enacted to prevent
weapons manufacturers from knowingly selling faulty weaponry to
the US Armed Forces, the FCA is now the primary means by
which the government combats fraudulent claims for healthcare
11
A qui tam action is an action brought under a statute that allows a private party,
known as a “relator,” to sue on behalf of the government. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1368 (9th ed. 2009). “Qui tam” is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase “qui tam pro
domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur,” meaning “[he] who sues in this
matter for the king as well as for himself.” Id.
12
See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2012).
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benefits.13 In addition to the federal government, twenty-nine states
and the District of Columbia have adopted false claims acts.14 In
this section, we present background information regarding the
Federal False Claims Act and a discussion of various state false
claims acts.
A. The Federal False Claims Act
The Government Accountability Office recently estimated that
approximately $72 billion in taxpayer funds is lost to fraud, abuse
and improper payments each year.15 The Federal False Claims Act
imposes civil liability on individuals and corporations that knowingly make or submit false claims for money or property to the United
States.16 Originally enacted in 1863 by President Abraham Lincoln,
the FCA empowered citizens to bring suits on behalf of the government to police the sale of faulty goods to Union forces by wartime profiteers.17 After several sweeping alterations, however, the
FCA has become increasingly utilized to combat healthcare fraud.18
The most recent of these changes occurred with the passage of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) in 2010.19
13

Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government
Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 121, 128 (2001); Robert T. Rhoad
& Matthew T. Fornataro, A Gathering Storm: The New False Claims Act Amendments and
Their Impact on Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, 21 HEALTH LAW. 14, 15 (2009).
14
U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE GREAT MYTHS OF STATE FALSE
CLAIMS ACTS 3 (2013), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/
sites/1/State_FCA_Great_Myths_Pages_web.pdf.
15
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMPROPER PAYMENTS: PROGRESS MADE BUT
CHALLENGES REMAIN IN ESTIMATING AND REDUCING IMPROPER PAYMENT 3 (2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/122319.pdf.
16
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
17
Marc S. Raspanti & David M. Laigaie, Current Practice and Procedure Under the
Whistleblower Provisions of the Federal False Claims Act, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 23, 24 (1998).
18
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers $3.8 Billion from
False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2013 (Dec. 20, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-civ-1352.html; see False Claims
Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2000)); see also Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009,
Pub. L. No. 111-21 Stat. 1617 (2009); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R.
3590, 111th Cong. 783-84 (2010) (enacted).
19
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 783-84 (2010)
(enacted) (changes definition of “obligation” to included “retention of overpayments”
thereby extending liability to persons receiving Medicare/Medicaid overpayments and
knowingly failing to return the amount in excess).
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According to the Department of Justice, the federal government
recovered nearly $23 billion through use of the FCA between 2009
and 2014.20
In addition to providing a means for the government to directly
recover funds lost through fraud, the FCA also allows private “relators” to bring qui tam actions against defendants that have violated the FCA.21 Relators pursuing an action under the FCA’s
whistleblower or qui tam provisions can receive fifteen to thirty
percent of the proceeds of any successful claim.22 These false
claims actions are discussed in more detail below.
1. Liability
The FCA identifies several types of actions that can give rise to
liability.23 The two most commonly asserted provisions of the FCA
establish liability for any person who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval,” or “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used,
a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent
claim.”24 For either of these provisions, the plaintiff must prove
three essential elements: (1) that the defendant made a claim for
payment from the government, (2) that the claim was false or fraudulent and (3) the defendant made the claim with knowledge of the
falsity.25

20

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $6 Billion
from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2014 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-nearly-6-billion-falseclaims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2014 (estimating total recoveries under the FCA between
January 2009 and September 2014 at $22.75 billion).
21
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
22
If the Department of Justice proceeds with the action, the originator of the claim is
to receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent. If the government decides not to
pursue the claim and the private person proceeds qui tam, that person is entitled to
twenty-five to thirty percent. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2012).
23
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012) (listing seven specific actions that can give rise to
liability under the FCA); see also United States v. Rivera, 55 F.3d 703, 709 (1st Cir. 1995)
(“The paradigmatic example of a false claim under the FCA is a false invoice or bill for
goods or services.”).
24
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
25
See id. § 3729(a) (emphasis added); Burke v. Record Press, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 26,
29 (D.D.C. 2013).
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The FCA defines a “claim” in two ways. First, a claim may be
“any request or demand . . . for money or property” made to the
United States government.26 In United States v. Alperstein, for example, the government brought an action under the FCA alleging
that a veteran had submitted false claims for free hospitalization to
which he was not entitled.27 Alternatively, a claim may be made to
any recipient of government funds where those funds were intended to be used to advance the government’s interest.28 For example, two subsidiaries of Johnson & Johnson agreed to pay over
$81 million to resolve an alleged FCA suit claiming the companies
had illegally promoted a drug for uses not approved of by the Food
and Drug Administration, which resulted in false claims being
submitted to government healthcare programs.29 Thus, any person
receiving funds traceable to the federal government is potentially
subject to liability under the FCA.30
Such claims only violate the FCA, however, when they are
“false or fraudulent.”31 Although the Supreme Court has interpreted the FCA broadly to include “all fraudulent attempts to
cause the Government to pay out sums of money,” courts have also recognized that not all forms of fraud give rise to liability under
the FCA.32 For example, in United States ex rel. Groxx v. AIDS Re26

31 U.S.C. §3729(b)(2) (2012).
183 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Fla. 1960) aff’d, 291 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961).
28
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(2) (2012).
29
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Johnson & Johnson Subsidiaries to Pay
Over $81 Million (Apr. 29th, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/
April/10-civ-500.html.
30
By redrafting the definition of “claim” and the intent requirement in the Fraud
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Congress effectively overruled the Supreme
Court’s decision in Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, which held that
a false claim must be made with the specific intent to defraud the government, rather than
merely defrauding a contractor utilizing government funds. See 553 U.S. 662, 668–69
(2008).
31
31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(1) (2012).
32
United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 233 (1968) (“This remedial
statute reaches . . . to all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums of
money.”); United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958) (“[T]he False Claims Act
was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on the Government.”); see United
States ex rel. Landers v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 972, 978–79
(W.D. Tenn. 2007) (precluding liability for violations of “the requirements providers
must meet to participate in the Medicare program,” because the HCFA/CMS forms do
not expressly or impliedly condition payment upon compliance with these conditions).
27
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search Alliance–Chicago, the Seventh Circuit precluded liability for
situations in which a certificate of compliance was falsified unless
payment was actually conditioned on the receipt of such a certificate.33 In general, however, claims may be false or fraudulent on
their face when the claimant seeks payment for more money than
what is due.34 Other claims meet this requirement, for example,
where the party fails to satisfy contractual requirements on which
payment is conditioned.35
A plaintiff must also prove that the defendant possessed
“knowledge” of the falsity.36 But this knowledge requirement is
broadly defined by statute to include: (1) having actual knowledge,
(2) acting in deliberate ignorance, or (3) reckless disregard of the
truth or falsity of the information.37 Thus, there is no requirement
that an individual specifically intends to defraud the government;
instead, a defendant merely needs to act with reckless disregard in
committing the falsehood.38
2. Qui Tam Provisions
The FCA provides that a private party, known as a “relator,”
may bring a so-called qui tam action on behalf of the United

33

415 F.3d 601, 604 (7th Cir. 2005) (“An FCA claim premised upon an alleged false
certification of compliance . . . also requires that the certification of compliance be a
condition of or prerequisite to government payment.”)
34
See, e.g., Ry. Logistics Int’l v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 252, 260 (Fed. Cl. 2012)
(holding that the contractor “outrageously inflated fraudulent claims” pertaining to the
rehabilitation of the Iraqi Republic Railway).
35
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 306
(3d Cir. 2011) (holding that impliedly certifying compliance with preconditioned
Medicare regulations incurs liability under the FCA).
36
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012).
37
Id. § 3729(b)(1) (2012). Prior to 1986, some courts required that a person have actual
knowledge of the fraudulent information used in the claim submitted to the government.
See, e.g., United States v. Mead, 426 F.2d 118, 123 (9th Cir. 1970) (requiring the
government to “prove that the defendant had the specific intent of deceit”). In 1986,
Congress passed the False Claims Act Amendments, which modified 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(b)(1) to broaden the knowledge requirement as described above.
38
See Eng’g & Const. Co. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 106 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (contractor
acted knowingly, or in deliberate ignorance with reckless disregard of falsehoods when
certifying the final bill).
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States.39 The FCA provides specific procedural requirements and
guidelines dictating how such actions may be brought.40
First, a qui tam complaint must be filed under seal and kept as
such for no less than sixty days, meaning that all records relevant to
the case must be kept secret, even from the defendant, until after
the court lifts the seal.41 The complaint and a written disclosure of
all other relevant information known by the whistleblower must
also be given to the Department of Justice.42 There is disagreement
among the courts, however, as to the level of specificity required in
the complaint. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that allegations of fraud must be pled with “particularity,”
yet some circuits additionally require the plaintiff to identify specific false claims that were submitted for payment.43
After receiving all the information filed by the relator, the government can then conduct its own investigation.44 Although the
filings are initially kept under seal for sixty days, the government
can seek an extension of time to continue its investigation.45 There
are no detailed statistics on the average length of time complaints
remain under seal, but the Department of Justice has indicated that
it is not unusual for a complaint to remain sealed for two years or

39

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
See id.
41
Id. § 3730(b)(2) (2012).
42
Id.
43
The Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Rule 9(b) requires
that a complaint identify at least one false claim for payment made to the government in
the pleadings while the First, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits merely require an
allegation of a scheme to submit such claims. See United States ex rel. Nathan v. Takeda
Pharm. N.A., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 457–58 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1759
(2014); United States ex rel. Grubbs v. Kanneganti, 565 F.3d 180, 190 (5th Cir. 2009);
United States ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., L.P., 579 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3454 (2010); United States ex. rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce
Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 854–55 (7th Cir. 2009); Ebeid ex rel. United States v. Lungwitz, 616
F.3d 993, 998–99 (9th Cir. 2009) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 801 (2010).
44
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: A PRIMER 2 (2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.
45
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2012) provides that “[t]he Government may, for good cause
shown, move the court for extensions of the time during which the complaint remains
under seal . . . .”
40
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more.46 At the conclusion of its investigation, the government can
either intervene and pursue the action itself or decline to take over
the action, allowing the relator to proceed alone.47 If the Department of Justice declines to intervene, then the government will not
be a party to the proceedings, though it can still recover the majority portion of any verdict won by the relator.48 Fewer than twentyfive percent of qui tam actions result in intervention by the government.49
However, if the government does intervene, the Department of
Justice will assume the primary role of prosecuting the action.50
The relator may still remain a party to the action, but the court in
such cases often imposes limitations on the relator’s participation
if the government or the defendant shows that unrestrained participation by the relator would be duplicative or cause undue delay.51
Moreover, the government can dismiss the action even over the
objection of the relator provided the relator is given an opportunity
for a hearing, or to settle with the defendant provided that the
court determines the settlement to be fair.52 In contrast, the relator
may only settle or dismiss the action with the consent of the government.53
If the government declines to intervene, the relator may proceed with the action qui tam.54 However, the government retains
the right to intervene at a later date, and may request to be served
with copies of any filings or deposition transcripts.55 After the court
46

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FALSE CLAIMS ACT CASES: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
QUI TAM (WHISTLEBLOWER) SUITS 2 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
pae/Civil_Division/InternetWhistleblower%20update.pdf.
47
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (2012).
48
See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2012) (establishing that the government is entitled to a
minimum of seventy percent of recovered funds where the DOJ decides not to pursue any
action).
49
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 2.
50
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2012).
51
Id. Such limitations may include limiting the number of witnesses the relator may
call, the length of those witnesses’ testimony, the cross-examination of witnesses or
otherwise limiting the relator’s participation as the court deems necessary. Id.
52
Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)–(B).
53
Id. § 3730(b)(1).
54
Id. § 3730(b)(3).
55
Id. However, the government must make a showing of good cause to intervene at a
later date. Id.
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unseals the complaint, the relator must serve the complaint upon
the defendant within 120 days.56
Penalties for violating the FCA can be harsh. If the government
or relator is able to prove that the defendant violated the FCA, then
the court may award up to triple the amount of actual damages suffered by the government because of the fraud, as well as costs and a
civil penalty from $5,500 to $11,000 per claim.57 In situations
where the government intervenes, the relator is entitled to fifteen
to twenty-five percent of the government’s total recovery, whether
through a favorable judgment or settlement.58 The exact percentage is dependent on the extent to which the information brought
forth by the relator “substantially contributed to the prosecution of
the action.”59 But if the government declined to intervene and the
relator proceeds alone, then the relator is entitled to receive twenty-five to thirty percent of the total recovery, plus an amount for
reasonable expenses, attorneys’ fees, and costs.60 However, the
FCA also permits the court to lower these awards to whatever the
court considers appropriate after taking into consideration the relators role in advancing the case.61
The FCA bars qui tam actions under certain circumstances.62
For example, such actions cannot be pursued by a relator with
“unclean hands,” like someone convicted of criminal conduct aris56

See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 46, at 3.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012). However, the court may impose as low as double
damages if the defendant fully cooperates with the government in a timely manner prior
to the commencement of any criminal, civil or administrative investigation into the
alleged violations. Id. § 3729(a)(2).
58
Id. § 3730(d)(1). This section also allows for a reduced award of no more than ten
percent where the court determines that the information arose primarily from disclosures
of specific information related to “allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media . . . .” Id.
59
Id.; see United States v. Gen. Elec., 808 F. Supp. 580 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (awarding the
relator twenty-two percent of the amount recovered by the United States even though the
relator could have disclosed the information earlier).
60
31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2012).
61
Id. § 3730(d)(3); see United States ex rel. Burr v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Florida,
Inc., 882 F. Supp. 166 (M.D.Fla. 1995) (awarding the relator fifteen percent rather than
twenty-five percent where the relator’s contribution was minimal and vigorously opposed
settlement without merit).
62
31 U.S.C § 3730(e) (2012).
57

2015]

THE NEW PLAGUE

759

ing from his role in the FCA violation.63 The FCA also bars pursuing a qui tam action where another individual is already doing
so.64 This is known as the “first-to-file bar.” Furthermore, the
FCA has a statute of limitations barring actions filed more than the
later of six years from the date of violation or three years after the
government knows or should have known of the violation, but in no
event longer than ten years after the violation of the FCA.65
The most litigated affirmative defense, however, is the “public
disclosure bar,” which bars qui tam actions that are based on publicly disclosed information.66 There is widespread debate among
the circuits, however, as to what constitutes “public disclosure.”
Some circuits, for example, require only a modest amount of disclosure before it rises to the level of public disclosure.67 Others require that the information be “widespread and notorious” before
the bar is triggered.68 However, the FCA provides an exception to
the bar where the relator is an “original source” of the information.69 An original source is a person who either voluntarily provided the government with the information prior to the public disclosure or who has significant independent knowledge beyond what
has already been publically disclosed.70
Congress recently narrowed the public disclosure bar and expanded the original source exception in the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010.71 Under these changes, the court
63

Id. § 3730(d)(3).
Id. § 3730(b)(5).
65
Id. § 3731(b).
66
Id. § 3730(e)(4). To trigger the public disclosure bar, the information must have
been disclosed in a (1) criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the government
or its agent is a party; (2) congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other
Federal report, hearing, or investigation; or (3) media report. See id.
67
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sciences, 99 F.3d 1000, 1008 (10th
Cir. 1996).
68
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Mossey v. Pal-Tech, 231 F. Supp. 2d 94, 97 (D.D.C.
2002).
69
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012).
70
Id. § 3730(b)(4)(B). The FCA previously required that a relator must have “direct
and independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based” in
order to qualify as an original source. This definition was altered in 2010 by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 901.
71
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 783–84 (2010)
(enacted); see also Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, 11 Stat. 1617, 1623
64
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cannot dismiss an FCA claim based on the public disclosure bar if
the government opposes dismissal of the qui tam action.72 Additionally, civil litigation to which the government or its agents are
not a party cannot by itself give rise to a public disclosure.73 The
Affordable Care Act also removed the requirement that an original
source have “direct and independent knowledge” of the information giving rise to the FCA violation.74 Now relators without direct
knowledge of the violations can bring FCA claims, so long as they
have independent knowledge that materially adds to the allegation.75 In spite of these modifications, the public disclosure bar appears to remain a key issue in FCA qui tam actions.76
B. State False Claims Actions
Thirty states currently have false claims acts in place.77 While
the state statutes vary to some degree, they generally employ the
same procedures as those of the Federal False Claims Act, but with
submissions filed with the state attorney general instead of the Department of Justice. Where a relator uncovers fraud under a stateadministered Medicaid program, both the state’s false claim sta(changes definition of “obligation” to include “retention of overpayments” thereby
extending liability to persons receiving Medicare/Medicaid overpayments and knowingly
failing to return the amount in excess).
72
31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(4)(A) (2012). The alteration effectively overrules the Supreme
Court’s holding in Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, which affirmed the bar as being
jurisdictional and therefore non-waivable. 549 U.S. 457, 467–78 (2007).
73
31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(4) (2012).
74
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 783–84 (2010)
(enacted).
75
31 U.S.C § 3730(b)(4)(B) (2012).
76
See David M. Nadler & Justin A. Chiarodo, The Public Disclosure Bar: New Answers
and Open Questions, 47 PROCUREMENT LAW. 1, 18 (2011).
77
See JOHN F. CARROLL, CTR. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PUB. INTEGRITY, FALSE
CLAIMS ACT: AN INSPECTOR GENERAL’S BEST FRIEND (Nov. 2014), available at
http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/public-integrity/files/comm
unity_contribution_-_john_carrol.pdf. States with false claims acts include California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, as well as the District of
Columbia. Of these, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New
Hampshire, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin each employ “Medicaid only” False Claims
Acts.
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tute and the Federal False Claims Act would be implicated. Similarly, in states where no false claims act exists, the federal funding
component of a state-administered Medicaid program would likely
be sufficient to justify use of the Federal False Claims Act to address Medicaid fraud.
Under the Social Security Act, each state with a false claims act
of its own is eligible for a ten percent increase in the percentage of
the false claims act recoveries for which a recovery is had.78 To
qualify for the financial incentive, a state’s false claims act must:
(1) establish liability to the state for false or fraudulent claims, as
described in the Federal False Claims Act, with respect to Medicaid spending; (2) contain provisions that are at least as effective in
rewarding and facilitating qui tam actions for false or fraudulent
claims as those described in the FCA; (3) contain a requirement for
filing an action under seal for sixty days with review by the State
Attorney General; and (4) contain a civil penalty that is not less
than the amount of the civil penalty authorized under the FCA.79
The federal Office of the Inspector General determines whether
the state statute meets these criteria, and is thus eligible for the ten
percent incentive.80 Unsurprisingly, the federal incentive has increased the uniformity of the state false claims acts, at least insofar
as Medicaid fraud is concerned.
In addition to the state laws, several cities and counties have
their own false claims acts. New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia,
and Allegheny County, Pennsylvania each have their own version
of the False Claim Act with qui tam provisions, enabling them to
recover money at the municipal or county level.81

78

Section 1909 of the Social Security Act provides that any state deemed to have
qualifying laws may receive a ten-percentage-point increase in its share of any amounts
recovered under such laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(h) (2012).
79
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING STATE FALSE
CLAIMS ACTS, *10 (Mar. 13, 2013), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/false
claimsact/guidelines-sfca.pdf.
80
Roughly half of the thirty states with false claims acts currently meet these criteria.
81
See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 7, ch. 8 (West).
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II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense in patent litigation, in which the defendant asserts that the patentee has procured
its patent through improper conduct before the USPTO.82 This
judicially created doctrine derives from a trio of Supreme Court
cases dealing with the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.83 Prior
to the development of the inequitable conduct doctrine, courts often refused to grant an injunction to a patentee that had engaged in
egregious misconduct, and thus came to the court with “unclean
hands.”84 Under the modern inequitable conduct doctrine, which
is tantamount to defrauding the USPTO, the result of a successful
showing by a defendant is even more severe. A finding of inequitable conduct may not only jeopardize a company’s entire patent
portfolio but may spark additional antitrust and unfair competition
claims.85
As obtaining a patent is an ex parte procedure, all persons substantively involved in the prosecution of the patent application owe
a duty of candor to the USPTO.86 This duty requires these persons
to disclose all known information material to patentability.87 Acts
typically constituting inequitable conduct include failing to submit
material prior art known by the applicant, failing to explain references in a foreign language, misstatements of facts concerning patentability, and mis-description of inventorship.88 As full disclosure
82
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
83
See Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1993); Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945); Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
84
See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287.
85
See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (where
inequitable conduct gave rise to an unfair competition claim); Walker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965) (where inequitable conduct gave
rise to antitrust action).
86
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office . . . .”).
87
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (“[All persons involved in the patent application owe] a duty to
disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to
patentability as defined in this section.”).
88
See McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913–26
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding inequitable conduct where attorney failed to disclose material
information from related patent application); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular
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of information pertaining to an invention may contradict the selfinterests of many patent applicants, the doctrine of inequitable
conduct imposes severe penalties for violating this duty. If the defense is proved, the entire patent (and possibly all related patents in
the same family) will be held unenforceable, even if the claims of
the patent are otherwise valid.89 In fact, the effects of such a finding
are so severe that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. recently referred to the
doctrine as an “atomic bomb” and elevated the standard of what
must be shown to prove inequitable conduct.90
To prove inequitable conduct post-Therasense, an accused infringer must show by clear and convincing evidence that the patentee either failed to disclose, misrepresented, or submitted false information to the patent office (1) that was material to patentability
and (2) with the specific intent to deceive the patent office.91 The
intent and materiality are separate elements and the existence of
one cannot provide the basis for inferring the other.92 Proving that
an applicant should have known of the materiality of a reference
but did not submit it to the USPTO, for example, does not satisfy
the deceptive intent element by itself.93
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (inferring intent where applicant
“knew or should have known” that information was relevant to the prosecution); Bruno
Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs. Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1350–54 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (finding inequitable conduct for failure to cite U.S. Food and Drug Administration
proceeding); Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(finding inequitable conduct for failing to disclose test data inconsistent with data
disclosed in the specification); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1194–95
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding inequitable conduct where applicant failed to disclose that
declarations from outside experts had been previously employed by the applicant);
Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1229–30 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (inequitable
conduct found where applicant improperly claimed small entity status).
89
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir.
1988); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex. Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see also
Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808–12 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
90
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc) (citations omitted).
91
See id. at 1276.
92
See id. (rejecting the “sliding scale” approach where a court requires less evidence of
intent where a reference is highly material); see also Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega
Corp., 232 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
93
Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2008).

764

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:747

Under Therasense, the defendant must show but-for materiality
with respect to the patentee’s omission or misrepresentation to the
patent office.94 Therefore, even when a patentee withholds information, it only warrants a finding of inequitable conduct if, but-for
the withholding, the patentee would not have been successful in
prosecuting the claim. However, in heightening the standard to
but-for materiality, the Federal Circuit carved out an exception in
cases of affirmative egregious misconduct.95 Where a patent applicant has engaged in such conduct, the materiality prong is met regardless of whether the claim would have issued. An affirmative act
of egregious misconduct includes actions such as intentionally filing false affidavits.96 Absent more telling actions, however, merely
failing to disclose prior art references does not constitute such misconduct.
The second element of the inequitable conduct analysis requires proving that the patentee deliberately decided to withhold,
misrepresent, or falsify a known material reference with the intent
to deceive the USPTO.97 In practice, this element provides a significant hurdle for defendants.98 Parties are rarely able to show direct
evidence of deceptive intent. However, courts may infer such intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence, provided that such
an inference is “the single most reasonable inference able to be
drawn from the evidence.”99 The evidence presented must therefore be “sufficient to require a finding of deceitful intent in the light
of all the circumstances.”100 A patentee’s deceptive intent, therefore, cannot be inferred where multiple reasonable inferences may
94

Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291.
See id. at 1292 (carving out an exception for cases where a patentee “deliberately
planned and carefully executed scheme[s]” to defraud the PTO).
96
See id. (“When the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of egregious
misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is
material.”).
97
Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
98
Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct A Dying Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, LAW360
(May 23, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/444480/inequitable-conducta-dying-defense-2-years-post-therasense.
99
Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
100
Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (emphasis added).
95
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be drawn from the same evidence.101 As a result of the elevated
standards for both materiality and specific intent, it is significantly
more difficult to successfully raise an inequitable conduct defense
under Therasense.102
FALSE CLAIMS LIABILITY FOR INEQUITABLE
CONDUCT
The Central District of California recently denied Aventis
Pharma’s motion to dismiss an FCA claim based on an inequitable
conduct finding secured by its competitor Amphastar Pharmaceuticals in an underlying patent case.103 Amphastar alleges that Aventis knowingly charged the government inflated prices for its deepvein thrombosis drug, Lovenox (enoxaparin), by illegally obtaining
a patent through inequitable conduct before the USPTO.104
III.

This section provides background information pertaining to the
pending FCA action initiated by Amphastar, discusses the parallels
between antitrust claims based on inequitable conduct and Amphastar’s theory of false claims liability, and analyzes whether inequitable conduct during patent prosecution can serve as a basis for
FCA liability. We conclude that given the broadening of the False
Claims Act in recent years, it is likely that a court would find inequitable conduct to be a proper basis for a finding of FCA liability,
provided certain other elements are proven. Consequently, nearly
every patent holder that does business with the federal government, which includes anyone producing pharmaceuticals covered
by Medicare or other government programs, may soon be exposed
to FCA liability based on Amphastar v. Aventis.
A. Amphastar Pharmaceuticals v. Aventis Pharma S.A.
The feud between Aventis and Amphastar began in 2003, when
Amphastar filed an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) with the FDA seeking the right to manufacture a ge-

101
102
103
104

Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290–91 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Davis, supra note 98.
Memorandum and Order, supra note 2, at 2.
Id.
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neric version of Aventis’s Lovenox.105 In its ANDA, Amphastar
asserted that Aventis’s patent covering Lovenox was invalid, unenforceable, and/or not infringed by Amphastar’s generic product.106
Shortly after Amphastar filed its ANDA, Aventis sued Amphastar
for patent infringement.107 Amphastar then successfully raised the
defense of inequitable conduct and filed a counterclaim alleging
that Aventis violated the antitrust laws by filing a baseless patent
infringement suit.108 The district court granted Amphastar’s motion for summary judgment on its inequitable conduct defense,
finding that Aventis concealed material information from the
USPTO during prosecution and holding the patent unenforceable.109 On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding that the district court applied an incorrect standard and
directing the lower court to apply a clear and convincing evidence

105

Id. ANDAs are a frequently deployed mechanism for the early introduction of
generic competition. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 10 (2002), available at https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftcstudy/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf (reporting challenges involving 130 drugs between 1984
and 2000); Examining the Senate and House Versions of the “Greater Access to Affordable
Pharmaceuticals Act”: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 113, 117
(2003) (statement of Timothy Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission) (noting
challenges involving more than eighty drugs between January 2001 and June 2003).
106
Amphastar’s ANDA contained a Paragraph IV certification against Aventis’s patent
on Lovenox. As part of the ANDA, the generic applicant is required to make one of the
following certifications regarding each patent listed in the Orange Book that claims the
drug it seeks to copy: (I) that the drug is not patented or that patent information has not
been filed; (II) that the patent has expired; (III) that the generic drug will not enter the
market until the patent expires; or (IV) that the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug for which the application is submitted. 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)–(IV). These are called Paragraph I, II, III, and IV
certifications, respectively. By making a Paragraph IV certification, a generic
manufacturer can seek FDA approval to market a generic equivalent of a pioneer’s
patented drug before the patent term has expired.
107
Subsection 271(e) of the Patent Act provides that making a Paragraph IV
certification alone is an act of patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A).
Consequently, the mere filing of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification allowed
Aventis to sue Amphastar for infringing its patent.
108
Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. EDCV-09-0023 MJG, 2012 WL
5512466, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012).
109
Id. (citing Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 2d 952
(C.D. Cal. 2005)).
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standard.110 On remand, the district court again found the patent
unenforceable on inequitable conduct grounds and the Federal Circuit affirmed.111
In the subsequent litigation, the district court dismissed Amphastar’s antitrust counterclaims on the grounds that the complaint failed to allege an “antitrust harm,” a necessary element of a
Sherman Act violation.112 Even if there had been a harm, the court
found that Aventis was shielded from antitrust liability under the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which largely immunizes brand-name
manufacturers from liability for petitioning the government, even if
anticompetitive in nature.113 Unbeknownst to Aventis, Amphastar
had also filed a qui tam complaint under seal with the district court
in January 2009.114 After the government decided not to intervene
in the qui tam suit, the complaint was unsealed in October 2011.
Amphastar’s complaint asserted that Aventis made false statements to the USPTO in order to acquire a patent, submitted false
claims to the government for Lovenox,115 and then engaged in baseless patent litigation with Amphastar in an effort to extend its illeg-

110

Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
111
Id. at 1349.
112
Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. EDCV-09-0023 MJG, 2012 WL
5512466, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012).
113
Id. A patentee’s immunity from antitrust liability derives from the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine. This immunity may be broken if the defendant can prove that the infringement
suit is a “mere sham” and in reality is “an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor.” This can occur where the patentee has engaged in illegal
vertical agreements in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act or if the patentee has
engaged in so called Walker Process fraud. See In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust
Litigation, 203 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2000); California Motor Transp. Co. v.
Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510–11 (1972) (“We said, however, in Noerr that
there may be instances where the alleged conspiracy ‘is a mere sham to cover what is
actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships
of a competitor and the application of the Sherman Act would be justified.’”).
114
Memorandum and Order, supra note 2, at 2.
115
By seeking reimbursement or payment through Medicare or other federal programs,
a seller of pharmaceutical products submits a claim for payment to the government within
the meaning of the FCA. In this case, the fact that Lovenox was patented permitted
Aventis to charge an elevated price for the drug, and submitting claims at that elevated
price forms the basis for the “false” or “fraudulent” nature of the claims.
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al monopoly.116 In ruling on motions to dismiss, the district court
determined that although the finding of inequitable conduct had
been publicly disclosed, Amphastar was the “original source.”117
Nonetheless, the court dismissed the qui tam suit, with leave to
amend, on the grounds that Amphastar failed to allege with particularity that Aventis’s false claims were paid for or approved by the
government, as required by Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.118
After amending its complaint, Amphastar asserted that Aventis
(1) made false statements to the USPTO in prosecuting two pharmaceutical patents (2) thereby illegally obtained monopoly power
over enoxaparin in the US market and (3) leveraged that monopoly
power to sell over six million units of Lovenox to the government
or its distributors at inflated monopoly prices, totaling at least $470
million in false claims between 1993 and 2002.119 This amended
complaint survived additional motions to dismiss and is currently
being litigated.120

116

Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. EDCV-09-0023 MJG, 2012 WL
5512466, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012).
117
Id. at *2.
118
Id. at *13.
119
Amended Complaint at 12-13, ¶¶ 37, 41, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Aventis
Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023, (C.D. Cal. Dec. 03, 2012); Memorandum and Order,
supra note 2, at 7.
120
Most recently, on March 26, 2015, the Court denied Amphastar’s motion for issue
preclusion, in which it sought to collaterally estop Aventis from contravening certain facts
established during the prior ANDA litigation. Order Re: Issue Preclusion Motion at 1-2,
Amphastar Pharmaceuticals Inc., v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023, (C.D. Cal.
March 26, 2015). The Court noted that it was in the process of drafting its order on
original source jurisdiction, regarding whether Amphastar was an “original source of the
information,” on which the suit is based. Id. The issue of whether Amphastar is an
“original source” is also being litigated in an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal. Certification Order 8 U.S.C. § 1292(b) at 1, Amphastar Pharmaceuticals
Inc., v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. 5:09-cv-00023, (C.D. Cal. June 6, 2014). In August 2014,
the Ninth Circuit granted a petition for permission to appeal the district court’s Order
denying Aventis’ Motion for Summary Judgment for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 31
U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B), agreeing to examine what exactly a relator's pre-filing disclosure
must include if the relator wishes to qualify as an "original source." Amphastar
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Aventis Pharma S.A., Case No. 14-56382 (9th Cir. 2014). The
parties have submitted opening, responsive, and reply briefs, though the Ninth Circuit
has yet to issue an opinion.
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B. Distinguishing Walker Process Claims
Although Amphastar’s theory of false claims liability is novel,
the use of the defense of inequitable conduct as the basis for a
counterclaim is not unprecedented. In fact, inequitable conduct is
frequently used as the basis for certain antitrust counterclaims,
which are known as Walker Process claims. Such claims are typically
brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits the
use of anticompetitive conduct to acquire or maintain a monopoly.121 A patent can give its owner market exclusivity, thereby
thwarting competition in a given field for a limited period of time.
However, when patent holders sue their competitors for infringement, they generally enjoy immunity from antitrust liability under
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes petitioning the
government for redress, even when such conduct is anticompetitive.122 This immunity can be defeated, however, if the accused infringer establishes that the patent was obtained from the USPTO
through knowing and willful fraud, commonly referred to as Walker
Process fraud.123 As discussed in Part II, supra, in order to prove in121

See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (providing that “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”).
122
See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovation, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir.
1998); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127,
136–37 (1961) (clarifying that “the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons
from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take
particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or a monopoly” and
that the “concept of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their
wishes known to their representatives”); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657, 670 (1965) (“Noerr shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence
public officials regardless of intent of purpose . . . . Joint efforts to influence public
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to eliminate
competition.”); California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972) (“Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government.”).
123
See Walker Process Equip., Inc., v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172,
177 (1965) (holding that a party who uses a patent procured through intentional fraud on
the USPTO to obtain or preserve a monopoly may be subject to antitrust liability). Note
that Walker Process claims differ from Handgards claims, which are antitrust
counterclaims that attempt to establish that the patent holder knowingly asserted a patent
that was invalid or did not infringe the defendant’s technology merely to disrupt a
competitors business practices. See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986 (9th
Cir. 1979).
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equitable conduct under the new Therasense standard, an accused
infringer must demonstrate that a patentee made a material misrepresentation to the patent office with the specific intent to deceive
the patent office.124 This elevated standard for proving inequitable
conduct is essentially the same as what is needed to prove Walker
Process fraud.125
In the same way inequitable conduct serves as the basis for
Walker Process antitrust claims, inequitable conduct may also serve
as the basis for FCA claims. Prior to Therasense, establishing Walker Process fraud required significantly more than proving inequitable
conduct.126 However, with the heightened standards adopted under
Therasense, there is now a significant overlap between the elements
of an inequitable conduct defense and a Walker Process counterclaim.127 Similarly, a showing of fraud on the patent office may
serve as the basis for establishing that the patent holder made a
fraudulent claim for payment from the government in violation of
the False Claims Act. However, there remain several key differences between Walker Process claims and FCA claims, which renders the analogy of using inequitable conduct as the basis for the latter problematic.
1. Overview of Walker Process Antitrust Claims
An antitrust claim relying on Walker Process fraud requires an
accused infringer to show (1) the patent holder engaged in knowing
and willful fraud before the USPTO in order to obtain the patent;
(2) clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent which must
be independent of the evidence of fraud; (3) that the patent would
124

Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(en banc).
125
Asim M. Bhansali & William S. Hicks, Trial Management After Therasense:
Inequitable Conduct, Walker Process Fraud, and the Seventh Amendment, 21 COMPETITION:
J. ANTI. & UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 1 (2012).
126
See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“[I]nequitable conduct is a broader, more inclusive concept than the common law
fraud needed to support a Walker Process counterclaim.”).
127
See, e.g., Gideon Mark & T. Leigh Anenson, Inequitable Conduct and Walker Process
Claims After Therasense and the America Invents Act, 16 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 361, 403 (2014)
(noting the “virtual alignment of inequitable conduct and Walker Process fraud that was
accomplished by Therasense”); see also Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Tech., Inc., 882 F.
Supp. 2d 160, 174 (D. Mass 2011).
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not have issued but-for the misrepresentation or omission of material facts; and (4) that the patent holder was aware of this fraud
while attempting to enforce the patent.128 These four elements
form the crux of both Walker Process fraud and inequitable conduct,
and provide grounds for breaking the antitrust immunity granted
under Noerr-Pennington.129 To establish liability and damages under
an antitrust theory, however, it is also necessary to prove the elements of a Sherman Act violation, including a showing that the patentee had monopoly power in a relevant and definable market, and
willfully acquired or maintained that power through anticompetitive behavior.130
Both Walker Process claims and the defense of inequitable conduct are focused on misconduct before the USPTO and require
that the patent applicant intentionally misled the examiner. Not
surprisingly, both claims typically arise out of the same conduct
and are supported by the same evidence.131 Prior to Therasense, inequitable conduct was considered a “broader, more inclusive concept than the common law fraud needed to support a Walker
Process counterclaim.”132 However, Therasense raised the standard
for inequitable conduct to essentially the same level as Walker
Process fraud.133
In spite of their similarities, there exist important distinctions
between the two doctrines.134 Most significantly, Walker Process
claims require proving the additional elements of an antitrust viola-

128

See Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068–71.
The decision to strip a plaintiff of the Noerr-Pennington immunity is controlled by
Federal Circuit law when the claim is brought in its jurisdiction, however the remainder
of the antitrust analysis proceeds under the law of the circuit in which the claim arose. See
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1068; Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d
1341, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
130
See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
(1965).
131
See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
132
Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d at 1069.
133
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see
also Metris U.S.A., Inc. v. Faro Tech., Inc., 882 F. Supp. 2d 160, 174 (D. Mass 2011).
134
Obviously there is a difference in result—inequitable conduct is a defense to
infringement that renders a patent unenforceable, while Walker Process fraud subjects the
patentee to antitrust liability including treble damages.
129
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tion beyond what is necessary to establish inequitable conduct.135
For example, prosecution of bad-faith patent litigation, where the
patentee knows that its patent is invalid or that the defendant’s
product does not infringe, can form the basis of a monopolization
claim, but more is needed.136 While fraudulently procuring a patent
constitutes inequitable conduct, that fraudulent action by itself has
no competitive impact and thus cannot constitute a violation of the
Sherman Act without more.137 Walker Process claims must rely on
the enforcement of a fraudulently obtained patent that causes anticompetitive injury; simply obtaining the patent, whether by fraud
or not, is insufficient to establish the antitrust claim.
2. Federal False Claims v. Walker Process Antitrust Claims
A Walker Process claim and an FCA claim based on an inequitable conduct theory are therefore closely related. In essence, a
Walker Process claim relies on the theory that a fraudulently obtained (or misused) patent permits the patentee to obtain monopoly power and reap monopoly profits. Where inequitable conduct is
the alleged fraud, a suit under the FCA based on this theory would
essentially mirror a Walker Process claim. Rather than allege anticompetitive effects under the Sherman Act, the government or relator would assert that the fraudulently obtained patent (regardless
of whether it was enforced) permitted the patentee to fraudulently
overcharge the government for patented items. In other words,
but-for the inequitable conduct before the USPTO, the product at
issue would have been unpatented, subject to rigorous marketplace
competition, and therefore significantly cheaper. A Walker Process
claim requires a showing that a fraudulently obtained patent
135

Violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act requires showing (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–
71 (1966).
136
See Bio-Technology Gen. Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 267 F.3d 1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir.
2001); Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled by
Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
137
FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., Inc., 835 F.2d 1411, 1418 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(“Mere procurement of a patent, whatever the conduct of the applicant in the
procurement, cannot without more affect the welfare of the consumer and cannot in itself
violate the antitrust laws.”).
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granted the patent holder actual monopoly power in a definable
market, and that the patentee then used the unlawfully obtained
monopoly power to stave off competition and reap excessive profits, thus causing antitrust injury to consumers. Similarly, an FCA
claim requires a showing that a fraudulently obtained patent permitted the patent holder to charge an elevated price and stave off
competition, thus causing the government harm by overcharging.
In both cases, the measure of damages from the consumer/government perspective is what the price of the product would
have been absent the fraudulently obtained patent (or, in Walker
Process claims, patent misuse). Where a Walker Process claim is
supported, an FCA claim will be as well, though the reverse is not
necessarily true.
One way of proving an FCA violation would then be to prove
monopolization, as under a Walker Process counterclaim. But a patentee need not monopolize a definable market in order to raise
prices. Excluding others from making a patented improvement to a
product can justify charging a higher price without capturing or
monopolizing an entire market. Because a Walker Process claim relies on antitrust laws, it is subject to a more stringent set of rules
than is needed to prove an FCA claim. A violation of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, for example, requires that the accused infringer
show that the patentee has market power and engaged in anticompetitive conduct, thereby causing an antitrust injury.138
In practice, proving market power presents a significant hurdle
to Walker Process claimants. Although market power can be proven
by either direct or circumstantial evidence, patents by themselves
do not necessarily confer monopoly power.139 The fact that a company holds a patent on a particular product does not demonstrate a
lack of alternative devices in the marketplace. As such, identifying
the relevant market is itself a challenging and often determinative

138

See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–571 (1966).
Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.1995);
Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 10, n.8 (1958); see Robert Merges,
Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 793, 793 (1988).
139
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analysis.140 In Unitherm Food System v. Swift-Eckrich, the Federal
Circuit explained that a relevant product market is composed of
“products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes
for which they are produced.”141 There, the Federal Circuit overturned the lower court’s finding of market power, which was predicated on expert testimony that the patented products were technologically unique. The Federal Circuit stressed that the proper
inquiry is not technological substitutability of a product, but economic substitutability.142 Therefore, where a patented product is
economically substitutable with another product, market power
cannot be established even when a patentee is nonetheless able to
raise prices.143 This significant challenge must be overcome in a
claim asserting Walker Process fraud, but would not necessarily
hinder an FCA claim based on inequitable conduct.
Under a Walker Process theory, an accused infringer must also
show that the patent holder has engaged in anticompetitive conduct. This amounts to not only showing that the patent was obtained through fraud, but that the patent holder was aware that the
patent was acquired through fraud at the time of the lawsuit.144 In
circumstances where a patent holder prosecuted the patent in
question, such a showing is straightforward. However, when the
patent holder was not involved in the prosecution of the patent application (for example, because the patent was licensed or purchased from another party), this element proves more difficult.
Under an FCA claim based on inequitable conduct, by contrast, a
relator need only show that the patentee billed the government
while deliberately ignoring or recklessly disregarding the fraudulent

140

See Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 375 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(overturning a jury verdict where the court determined the relevant market to be
essentially the patented invention and failed to consider products that were economically
substitutable).
141
See id. at 1363 (quoting United States v. AMR Corp, 335 F.3d 1109, 1113 (10th Cit.
2003)).
142
Unitherm, 375 F.3d at 1363–64.
143
See id.
144
See Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1069–70 (Fed. Cir.
1988); see also David Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Patent Exclusions After Therasense 26 (U.
Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-39, Dec. 12, 2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916074.
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circumstances under which the patent was obtained.145 Thus, the
bar is again lower for FCA claims than similar Walker Process
claims.
Hence, while Walker Process claims and FCA claims for inequitable conduct overlap significantly, there are material differences between the two theories. Unlike FCA claims, Walker Process
claims require proof of monopolization conduct, market definition,
and market power. While Walker Process claims focus on the patentee’s conduct while in possession of a patent, FCA claims based on
inequitable conduct focus on the fraudulent actions of the patentee
before the USPTO and the subsequent ability to charge higher
prices. Defenses regarding market power (i.e. one’s ability to
charge a fraudulently higher price) could arise in FCA litigation,
but showing market power is not a necessary element as it would be
in a Walker Process claim.
Overall, Walker Process claims are significantly more difficult to
prove than FCA claims. This suggests that if inequitable conduct
can serve as the basis for an antitrust claim, it should clearly be sufficient to serve as the basis for the more easily proved FCA claims.
The only area where FCA claims face a higher burden than Walker
Process claims is at the pleading stage of litigation. While both theories implicate Rule 9(b) in that fraud on the PTO must be pled with
particularity, only the FCA claim (and only in certain circuits)
would also require a plaintiff to include representative examples of
false claims made to the government.146 However, this difference in
pleading standards between the two theories does not alter the
conclusion that the factual underpinnings necessary to support a
Walker Process antitrust counterclaim should be more than sufficient to support an FCA claim based on inequitable conduct.
C. Suitability of Inequitable Conduct as a Basis in FCA Actions
While the analogy to Walker Process counterclaims suggests similarities with Amphastar’s FCA claim, it is not yet clear how liability under the FCA can arise due to inequitable conduct and
145

31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) defines knowledge as (1) having actual knowledge, (2) acting
in deliberate ignorance, or (3) reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.
146
See supra note 43.
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whether such liability is proper. Here, we discuss the difficulty of
proving Amphastar’s novel theory of FCA liability, and the problems associated with allowing inequitable conduct to serve as the
basis for an FCA violation.
1. Challenges of Establishing Liability
The path to establishing FCA liability based on inequitable
conduct is fraught with obstacles. Any plaintiff alleging an FCA
violation must prove three essential elements: (1) the defendant
made a claim for payment from the government, (2) the claim was
false or fraudulent, and (3) the defendant made the claim with
knowledge of the falsity.147 An FCA suit based on an inequitableconduct theory draws upon two discrete instances of fraud. First,
the patentee must have committed fraudulent acts while prosecuting the patent application as discussed in Part II. Second, the patentee must have known of the fraudulent acquisition of the patent
and nevertheless made claims for payment to the government at
prices above what it could have charged absent its fraudulently obtained patent and/or enforcement of that patent. Presumably, an
accused infringer would only raise a false claims allegation after a
court had made a finding of inequitable conduct, though it is possible for a competitor to file suit before the court issues a final ruling
of inequitable conduct, based solely on evidence uncovered by the
accused infringer in discovery. However, because some circuits
require that FCA claims be pled with representative examples of
false claims made to the government, an alleged infringer who
plans to bring a false claims allegation claim may need to conduct
additional investigations beyond what is discovered in the patent
infringement case in order to adequately plead the FCA claim. This
could include Freedom of Information Act-type requests for information regarding payments made by the government.
Because two separate instances of fraud need to be proven, an
FCA claim will likely be heavily fact-dependent. The first element—that the patentee made a claim for payment from the government—could likely be proven merely by pointing to the defendant’s promotion and sale of products that were paid for through
147
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2012); Burke v. Record Press, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 26,
29 (D.D.C. 2013).
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government programs, such as Medicare, as seen in Amphastar’s
allegations against Aventis.148 The second element—that the claim
was false or fraudulent—would be established by showing that a
patent was acquired through inequitable conduct, allowing the patentee to sell its product at elevated prices.149 The third element—
proving that the patent holder made the claim with knowledge of
the falsity—would further require that the defendant, at the very
least, had reckless disregard in charging those elevated prices for
products purchased (or reimbursed) with government funds.
Recasting these elements to more directly address an FCA
claim based on inequitable conduct, a plaintiff much show (1) that
the government purchased a product incorporating the patented
subject matter; (2) that the patent was obtained due to inequitable
conduct before the patent office, allowing the patent holder to
charge inflated prices; and (3) the patentee knew or showed reckless disregard in charging the government at these inflated prices.150
Showing that a patent holder in fact sold a patented product at
elevated prices may be straightforward in some instances, but it
could be the subject of extensive expert testimony. If a plaintiff can
obtain documentation from either the government or the patent
holder establishing that a claim for payment for the patented product was made, then the first element of the FCA claim is met. But
even if this can be shown, there remains the formidable hurdle of
148

See Memorandum and Order, supra note 2.
This element can then be broken into two distinct parts, subject to different types of
proof: (1) the patent was fraudulently acquired, provable with reference to
communications with the patent office and internal communications demonstrating
knowledge of omitted materials; and (2) that the patent actually allowed the patentee to
charge elevated prices, which likely requires economic expert testimony and evidence
that either the patentee was able to exclude competitors from the market or was able to
use its patent to tout a unique feature or characteristic of its product that justified
elevated prices. If the patent was not obtained by fraud, there is no fraudulent claim
submitted to the government. Likewise, if the patent had no effect on the price charged to
the government, there would be no false or fraudulent claim submitted to the
government.
150
Mirroring the elements of an FCA violation: (1) that the defendant made a claim for
payment from the government, (2) that the claim was false or fraudulent and (3) the
defendant made the claim with knowledge of the falsity. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012);
Burke v. Record Press, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2013).
149
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overcoming a Rule 9(b) objection at the pleading stage. Rule 9(b)
requires that allegations of fraud, such as violations under the
FCA, must be pled with particularity to ensure that frivolous and
unsupported claims do not make their way into court.151 The district court in Aventis v. Amphastar, for example, ruled in favor of
Aventis on its motion to dismiss Amphastar’s qui tam suit because
of Amphastar’s failure to plead with particularity that a false claim
was made.152 However, the court granted Amphastar leave to
amend its complaint, and Amphastar was able to add additional details to its amended complaint that satisfied the pleading requirement. Absent such specificity in the allegations, a court is likely to
dismiss any such FCA claim. Potential plaintiffs must therefore
rely on documentation or other evidence uncovered in the underlying patent litigation (or otherwise available to them) rather than
mere unsupported allegations. This may have practical implications for parties facing inequitable conduct allegations as well as the
courts moderating these disputes.153
To meet the second element of an FCA claim, the plaintiff
must first prove that a patent was obtained due to inequitable conduct. In some cases, the plaintiff could simply rely on a court’s
finding of inequitable conduct in an underlying patent infringement
action. But if, for example, the underlying litigation is stayed or asyet unresolved, one may need to affirmatively plead the elements of
an inequitable conduct defense. Next, the plaintiff must prove that
the price the government paid—or for which the FCA defendant
submitted claims—was higher than it would have been absent the
enforcement of the now-unenforceable patent. This essentially requires a showing of actual harm to the government and a causal link
between the inequitable conduct and the fraudulent overcharging.
151

FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). Note, however, that not all circuits require that examples of an
actual claim be pled in an FCA complaint. In the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh
Circuits, FCA claims must be pled with representative samples of the alleged fraudulent
conduct. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 155 (3d Cir. 2014).
However, in the First, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, FCA claims only need to be pled
with particular details of a scheme to submit false claims and reliable indicia that lead to a
strong inference that claims were actually submitted. Id. at 156–57.
152
Amphastar Pharm. Inc. v. Aventis Pharma SA, No. EDCV-09-0023 MJG, 2012 WL
5512466, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2012).
153
See infra Part IV.
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Thus, the court must distinguish between instances where the patented device or component caused an actual increase in the price
of the product with instances where having a patent on the technology may have had no such effects. In practice, it is likely that
this type of analysis would closely mirror the analysis conducted
under the Sherman Act in establishing monopoly power. For example, although a showing of monopoly power is not necessary to
prove that prices were in fact elevated, such a showing can create
an inference of unlawfully elevated prices where actual direct evidence is lacking. In contrast, if the patentee’s competitors used alternative components not covered by the patent, then the presence
of the patent may not have actually enabled the patent holder to
charge a supra-competitive price. Economically substitutable alternatives may negate one’s ability to charge elevated prices, just as
they negate a finding of monopoly power. That said, a showing of
monopoly power is not necessarily needed to show that prices were
elevated; an FCA claim may be therefore be sustained without the
patentee having monopoly power. For example, if a pioneering
smart phone manufacturer developed a new, faster processor, patented the technology, and subsequently used that processor in a
particular brand of smart phones, the price of that brand of smart
phone may increase simply because it is the only phone in the market with the faster processor. That does not, however, indicate that
the company has the ability to fix prices in the entire mobile-phone
industry, nor would it be necessary to show such market power to
prove an FCA claim.
This analysis may be slightly different in the context of the
pharmaceutical industry. In order to market a new prescription
drug, a pioneering pharmaceutical company must first obtain regulatory approval from the Food and Drug Administration.154 As part
of the approval process, the pharmaceutical company must list all
patents that claim its brand-name drug in the FDA’s so-called
Orange Book.155 Listing these patents in the Orange Book essentially
154

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (“No person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into
interstate commerce any new drug, unless an approval of an application . . . is effective
with respect to such drug.”).
155
The “Orange Book” is the common name for the FDA publication “Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations.” This publication is updated
monthly. FDA, CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS
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prevents the FDA from granting a competitor the right to market
and sell a generic version of the patented drug unless the generic
challenger (i.e., ANDA applicant) can show that the patent is
invalid or not infringed by the proposed generic.156 It is almost axiomatic that products without a generic competitor, even if they
face economic competition from drugs that target similar symptoms, are priced significantly higher than generics. And because the
mere filing of an application to manufacture a patented drug is considered an action of patent infringement,157 the mere listing of these
patents in the Orange Book is a de facto act of patent assertion that
alone can lead to significantly elevated prices. If the drug patent
was acquired by fraud on the patent office, then the second element
of an FCA claim is likely proven. Whereas a Walker Process claim
on that basis might depend on an actual showing of monopolization, an FCA claim against a brand-name drug manufacturer could
likely rely solely on the fact that the exclusivity provided by the
FDA itself permits the patent holder to charge significantly elevated prices (in part because it serves as a bar to competition).
Under the third element of an FCA claim, a plaintiff must also
prove that the patent holder knowingly, or at least recklessly, overWITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (2008) [hereinafter Orange Book],
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/docs/preface/ecpreface.htm. The FDCA
requires a patent holder to include in its NDA “the patent number and the expiration
date of any patent which claims the drug for which the applicant submitted the
application or which claims a method of using such drug and with respect to which a
claim of patent infringement could reasonably be asserted if a person not licensed by the
owner engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of the drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)
(2012). The patent numbers and expiration dates are then published in the Orange Book.
Process patents and certain composition of matter patents are precluded from being listed
in the Orange Book, though generic manufacturers may still be sued for infringing these
unlisted patents.
156
See generally Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch–Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
171 (2008); Matthew Avery & Mary Nguyen, The Roadblock for Generic Drugs: Declaratory
Judgment Jurisdiction for Later Generic Challengers, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2013),
available at http://ncjolt.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Avery-+-Nguyen-Final.pdf.
157
The Hatch–Waxman Act provides that filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(“ANDA”) with a so-called Paragraph IV certification that the patent is invalid or will
not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the generic drug for which the
application is submitted is itself an act of patent infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)
(“It shall be an act of infringement to submit . . . an [ANDA] for a drug claimed in a
patent or the use of which is claimed in a patent . . . .”).
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charged the government. This means that the plaintiff must convince a judge or jury that the patent holder knew, should have
known, or recklessly disregarded (1) that the patent would be unenforceable for reasons of inequitable conduct and (2) that in the absence of this enforcement, the price of the product would have
been lower than what was charged to the government. Because a
plaintiff relying on Amphastar’s theory of FCA liability would likely only file suit after a finding of inequitable conduct in the underlying patent infringement case, proving that the patentee knew or
should have known that the patent was unenforceable may be a
simple matter of res judicata. Inequitable conduct already requires
proving but-for materiality and specific intent to deceive the patent
office. Thus, a finding of inequitable conduct will necessarily include a finding that the patentee had specific intent to withhold
material information from the patent office. As such, a showing of
inequitable conduct in the underlying patent infringement case
alone should be sufficient to demonstrate in an FCA case that the
patentee knew or should have known that its patent would not have
otherwise been granted and would be unenforceable under the law.
However, this is not the case if the patent holder was not the party
that engaged in the inequitable conduct, but merely acquired the
patent after the fact. In that case, it may be more difficult for the
FCA plaintiff to establish that the patent holder had knowledge
that the patent would be unenforceable. Without a showing of this
knowledge, establishing the second portion of this element would
not be possible.
Lastly, showing that, in the absence of the patent holder’s fraudulently obtained patent, the price of the relevant product would
have been lower than what was charged to the government will
likely be more difficult for an FCA plaintiff to prove. Knowing that
a particular patent is unenforceable does not necessarily indicate
that a patent holder knows that its pricing of a product is elevated,
especially on products covered by multiple patents. Further, the
product might incorporate other unique features or rely on branding to justify a higher price than other alternatives in the market.
Absent a clear causal relationship between the fraudulently obtained patent and the elevated price, or a showing of monopolization based on that patent, it may be difficult to prove elevated pric-
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ing, and even more difficult to prove that a defendant knew of such
elevated pricing. While the FCA only requires the plaintiff to show
the patent holder recklessly disregarded the risk that the government was being overcharged, there remains a heavy burden of
proof that the plaintiff must overcome. Again, however, in the
pharmaceutical context, the burden of proof is likely lowered by the
industry-wide price disparity between generic and patent-protected
drugs, and the fact that most brand-name drugs are only covered by
a few patents.158
2. Is Such Liability Proper?
Antitrust claims, such as Walker Process claims, do not extend
liability to all improper conduct of patent holders in the marketplace, as the Sherman Act requires proof of additional elements.159
Where the Sherman Act requires proving both that the defendant
had market power in a relevant market and inflicted an antitrust
harm, an FCA suit based on inequitable conduct would merely require proof that prices were in fact higher such that the government was actually overcharged. Unlike a Walker Process claim, engaging in the often-difficult task of defining a relevant market and
showing whether a party has acquired or is likely to acquire monopoly power would be unnecessary to prove an FCA claim.
In contrast to the Sherman Act, which is only intended to stop
specific antitrust harms, the scope of the FCA is broad and is “intended to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might
result in financial loss to the Government.”160 The FCA incentivizes whistleblowers with knowledge of fraud on the government to
come forward with that information. As a result of this incentive
158

See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, How Many Patents Does It Take To Make a Drug?
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents and University Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L.
REV. 299, 300 (2010) (“The average was nearly 3.5 patents per drug in 2005, with over
five patents per drug for the best-selling pharmaceuticals; these numbers have increased
over time.”).
159
The Sherman Act requires a showing that the defendant has monopoly power or is
likely to acquire monopoly power. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–
71 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1)
the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power . . . .”).
160
United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.
2006).
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system, nearly $35 billion has been recovered in the past thirty
years, with over seventy percent of FCA suits being filed by private
relators.161 Consequently, holding liable those patentees who acquired their patents through fraud for selling their patented products to the government at elevated prices seems to align with the
purpose of the FCA. Moreover, extending FCA liability to situations where patent holders are knowingly overcharging the government, and by extension taxpayers, is consistent with recent
modifications to both the FCA and the doctrine of inequitable conduct.
The FCA was recently modified under the Affordable Care Act
to cover more fraudulent acts than ever before. Congress significantly diminished the public disclosure bar, which was the most
credible objection a party might raise in defending against a false
claims allegation.162 In principle, once a finding of inequitable conduct has been publicly released, relators should be prevented from
raising qui tam claims. Prior to the Affordable Care Act, the FCA
explicitly stated that information publicly disclosed through civil
litigation would raise the public disclosure bar.163 Under the Affordable Care Act amendments, however, public disclosure during
litigation only triggers the bar when the government is also a party
to the suit.164 Even if the public disclosure bar is properly invoked,
a relator would have two possible remedies. First, if the government objects to the court dismissing the case, then the relator may
proceed with the claim.165 Second, the Affordable Care Act lo161

U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FRAUD STATISTICS – OVERVIEW, OCT. 1, 1987 – SEPT. 30,
2013, (Dec. 23, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs_forms/CFRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf; Joel D. Hesch, Breaking the Siege: Restoring Equity and
Statutory Intent to the Process of Determining Qui Tam Relator Awards Under the False
Claims Act, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 217, 229 (2012) (“Whistleblower qui tam suits have
become the Government’s chief anti-fraud tool and account for about 70% of all funds the
DOJ recovers from defrauders.”).
162
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. 783–84 (2010)
(enacted).
163
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2009).
164
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(i) (2012) (“The court shall dismiss an action or claim
under this section, unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same
allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly disclosed … in a
Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a
party . . . .”).
165
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2009).
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wered the threshold for acquiring the “original source” status that
provides an exception to the public disclosure bar. The FCA previously required that a relator must have “direct and independent
knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based”
in order to qualify as an original source.166 This definition was altered by the Affordable Care Act to include relators who merely
have “knowledge that is independent of and materially adds” to
the allegations raised.167
Shortly after Congress enacted these changes to the FCA, the
Federal Circuit coincidentally raised the standards for proving inequitable conduct in Therasense to include only the most egregious
of frauds.168 While inequitable conduct previously only required a
showing that an omitted reference or misrepresentation was material, the Therasense standard requires “but-for” materiality.169
Thus, the reference must have been so material that the examiner
would not have issued the patent absent the patentee applicant’s
deception. Additionally, Therasense requires a finding that the patent applicant had specific intent to deceive the examiner.170 Such
intent must be affirmatively established and cannot simply be inferred from the materiality of the omitted source or misrepresentation.171 These heightened requirements mean that only the most
egregious frauds committed against the USPTO will rise to the level of inequitable conduct.
The broadening of the FCA over several decades, combined
with the recent narrowing of the inequitable conduct doctrine, has
made claims like Amphastar’s feasible. The FCA was created to
stop fraudulent appropriation of taxpayer funds. Using inequitable
conduct as the basis for an FCA claim aligns with this policy, especially under the heightened Therasense standard which punishes
only the most egregious forms of fraud before the patent office.
These instances of fraud, coupled with the patent holder’s knowledge that its own fraud affects the prices paid by the government,
166
167
168
169
170
171

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2009).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2012).
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1291.
See id. at 1290.
See id.
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are precisely what the FCA was designed to punish. The broadening of the FCA and the parallel heightening of the inequitable conduct standard have therefore created a substantial overlap where
liability can be found in the most egregious cases of fraudulent
conduct.
IV. AVOIDING FALSE CLAIMS LIABILITY
In light of the attention Amphastar’s suit is receiving in the
false claims bar, it is important that attorneys involved in patent
prosecution or false claims litigation consider steps to limit or avoid
liability under the FCA. The FCA bears the extreme penalty of
treble damages, a large portion of which, when based on a theory of
inequitable conduct, will likely go directly to a competitor. In this
section we highlight several measures attorneys and their clients
may consider taking to limit exposure to FCA liability.
A. Contractual Additions When Purchasing Patents
In situations where clients are purchasing or licensing patents
from another party, attorneys should consider the possibility of
FCA liability that could arise as a result of the seller or licensor’s
inequitable conduct. Several simple steps taken at the outset of
one’s manufacture or sale of patented products, including particular considerations included in any licensing contracts, could avoid
significant liability and minimize legal expenses in defending
against a suit brought under the FCA. For example, a licensee or
purchaser of a patent may wish to insert into any license or purchase agreement provisions making clear that the license or purchase is not limited to the patent itself, and will survive invalidity,
or guaranteeing partial reimbursement if the patent is invalidated as
well as indemnification against potential actions relating to government overcharges stemming from inequitable conduct. It may
also be beneficial to include in such contracts representations that
seller or licensor of the patent believes in good faith that each patent involved is valid and enforceable. Having such clear representations from the original patentee will provide additional evidence
that the current patent owner had no knowledge that the patent
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was unenforceable under the law and therefore could not have knowingly overcharged the government.
Likewise, a party selling patented goods to the government
should consider inserting provisions in its contracts providing for
single reimbursement upon a showing that its patent is invalid or
unenforceable.172 Alternatively, arbitration clauses, or clauses that
otherwise avoid payment of treble damages where inequitable conduct is found could prove to be an effective tool to limit exposure
to FCA liability.
B. Court Orders to Seal Evidence of Inequitable Conduct
When inequitable conduct has been discovered in an underlying patent litigation, the patentee should attempt to seal evidence
of the inequitable conduct to prevent it from being used in a subsequent FCA suit. Because FCA claims must be pled with particularity, sealing evidence of the basis for the alleged fraud (i.e., evidence
of the fraudulent obtained patent) may allow the FCA defendant to
get the claim dismissed at the pleading stage. However, sealing
such evidence may be challenging. The presumption of public
access to court records is rooted in the First Amendment. The Supreme Court of California has noted that “every lower court opinion of which we are aware that has addressed the issue of First
Amendment access to civil trials and proceedings has reached the
conclusion that the constitutional right of access applies to civil as
well as to criminal trials.”173 Several circuits also have recognized a
constitutional right of access to court records, with the Ninth Circuit noting that “the public and press have a first amendment right
of access to pretrial documents in general.”174 This extends to discovery documents, where “[g]enerally, the public can gain access
to litigation documents and information produced during discovery
unless the party opposing disclosure shows ‘good cause’ why a
protective order is necessary.”175 However, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide several exceptions to the general rule of
172

That is, a provision limiting potential damages to restitution or reimbursement, and
waiving any right to seek treble damages.
173
NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 358 (Cal. 1999).
174
Associated Press v. United States District Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).
175
Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 289 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).
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public access. Rule 26(c) provides that “[u]pon motion by a party
or by a person from whom discovery is sought . . . and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending . . . may
make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense.”176 Rule 26(c) specifically contemplates issuance of a protective order to ensure that “trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or
be revealed only in a designated way.”177 This exception is often
used to prevent or severely restrict the disclosure of source code,
trade secrets, and other highly sensitive corporate information, particularly information that could provide a competitive advantage to
competitors if disclosed.178
Because much of the discovery oriented toward uncovering inequitable conduct delves into what the inventors of patented technologies or processes knew at the time they filed their patent application, including lab notes, internal reports and the like, the trade
secret exception to public disclosure could be used to restrict the
release of that information. As seen in the Northern District of California’s model protective order for patent and trade secret cases,
such discovery can be restricted to attorneys’ eyes only, and the
standard order requires the destruction or return of any such information or documentation discovered within a short period after
the end of the litigation.179 Such a protective order could completely preclude third parties from uncovering documents supporting an
FCA claim, and could also present a strong bar to the opposing party’s use of such documents in subsequent FCA litigation.
176

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(7).
178
See, e.g., Model Protective Order for Litigation Involving Patents, Highly Sensitive
Confidential Information and/or Trade Secrets, available at http://www.cand.us
courts.gov/model-protective-orders.
179
See id. ¶ 7.1 (“Basic Principles. A Receiving Party may use Protected Material that is
disclosed or produced by another Party or by a Non-Party in connection with this case
only for prosecuting, defending, or attempting to settle this litigation. Such Protected
Material may be disclosed only to the categories of persons and under the conditions
described in this Order. When the litigation has been terminated, a Receiving Party must
comply with the provisions of section 15 below (FINAL DISPOSITION).”); see also id. ¶
15 (“Within 60 days after the final disposition of this action . . . each Receiving Party must
return all Protected Material to the Producing Party or destroy such material.”)
177
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Accordingly, parties accused of inequitable conduct during patent infringement suits would be well served by insistence on
strong protective orders in the underlying patent litigation. Under
an order such as the Northern District of California’s model, anything acquired by the defendant in discovery that is covered by the
terms of the protective order would be protected from use in a subsequent suit.180 While Walker Process claims are often brought as
counterclaims in the underlying patent litigation, and thus can rely
on the documents produced in that same case, a qui tam action
must be filed as a separate case and delivered to the attorney general for their approval. Thus, a protective order could prevent a FCA
plaintiff from successfully pleading its claims, and it would likely be
difficult for the plaintiff to unseal the evidence of inequitable conduct. In the words of the Second Circuit, “[i]t is ‘presumptively
unfair for courts to modify protective orders which assure confidentiality and upon which the parties have reasonably relied.’” 181
C. Public Disclosure of the Fraud
The public disclosure bar prevents a qui tam plaintiff from
bringing suit if the fraud has been publicly disclosed. Theoretically,
a patent holder could avoid liability by publicly disclosing its own
fraud. For example, if a patent holder learns that its patent is unenforceable due to prior fraudulent activity of the patent applicant,
180

See id. ¶ 1.
AT&T Corp. v. Sprint Corp., 407 F.3d 560, 562 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting SEC v.
TheStreet.com, 273 F.3d 222, 230 (2d Cir. 2001)). Note, however, that several other
circuits have permitted modifications of protective orders in “collateral litigation.” See In
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 333 F. Supp. 2d 333, 340 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (permitting a
modification because the reliance interest of objecting parties “can be preserved by
subjecting the intervenor to the provisions of a protective order” where such protection
are necessary); see also Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th
Cir. 2003) (“Where reasonable restrictions on collateral disclosure will continue to
protect an affected party’s legitimate interests in privacy, a collateral litigant’s request to
the issuing court to modify an otherwise proper protective order so that collateral litigants
are not precluded from obtaining relevant material should generally be granted.”).
Interestingly, the First Circuit found that permitting modification of a protective order to
grant a third party access to documents would be especially inappropriate in the event
that the Federal Government was the proposed intervenor. See Public Citizen v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 791 (1st Cir. 1988) (citing Martindell v. International
Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1979). In an FCA case, of course,
the federal government is the party involved, even if represented by a qui tam relator.
181

2015]

THE NEW PLAGUE

789

publicly disclosing this information might raise a public disclosure
bar. Likewise, publicly disclosing one’s fraud via a press release as
soon as the question of inequitable conduct has been decided, preferably couched in terms that disclose the facts but avoid terms like
“fraud,” could avoid liability. Attorneys should be cautious with
this approach, however, as the recent amendments to the FCA essentially allow for the government to have the final word as to
whether public disclosure will ultimately prevent the relator from
pursuing a qui tam suit. Approaching the government directly with
such information may be a far better approach and may avoid potentially embarrassing public disclosures. This proactive approach
could also lead to the possibility of amicable settlements with minimal public disclosure (and thus minimal embarrassment for the
patentee).
V. PREVENTING THE PLAGUE: SUGGESTIONS FOR
LEGISLATIVE ACTION
If the courts validate Amphastar’s novel theory, nearly every
patent holder that sells patent products to the federal government
could be at risk for liability under the FCA. In this section we discuss amendments to the FCA that may help to ensure fair treatment to patent holders while maintaining effective disincentives for
fraudulently overcharging the government.
A. Limiting Damages in False Claims Suits
Fraudulent conduct during prosecution of a patent application
can lead to harsh consequences. But at some point those consequences become so cumbersome as to both hinder the effectiveness
and efficiency of patent prosecution as well as punish wrongdoers
to an extent that is incommensurate with their behavior. Currently,
the most egregious of such fraud may incur the harsh penalties of
an inequitable conduct finding (the patent and related patents are
rendered unenforceable) and treble damages under the Sherman
Act (i.e. Walker Process fraud). Now, under Amphastar’s theory,
inequitable conduct may also lead to false claims liability and possibly treble damages for suits filed by either the government or a relator. However, the omissions or misrepresentations forming the ba-
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sis of an inequitable conduct defense would likely occur long before
the sale of any goods to the government and would only be tenuously connected to such a sale. As such, punishing this type of
fraud via the False Claims Act seems to be far beyond what was
envisioned by President Lincoln when he enacted this law in 1863.
To bring the scope of the FCA back in line with its original intent, we urge the enactment of legislation to provide for and alleviate some of these harsh realities. First, providing a specific remedy for products covered by fraudulently obtained patents may provide one avenue for such reform. Alternatively, limiting damages
under Amphastar’s theory to actual damages could soften the potentially overbearing FCA liability. While making false claims to
the United States government should obviously be punished, the
punishment should be proportional to the wrongful conduct. Furthermore, treble damages are arguably unnecessary under the Amphastar theory since treble damages are already available to claimants under a Walker Process theory.
B. Negating Liability by Granting Amnesty or Curing Inequitable
Conduct
Another option is to grant amnesty to patent holders who come
forward regarding fraud on the government, along the lines of the
amnesty granted under the US Government’s Antitrust Criminal
Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act (“ACPERA”).182 This
would provide a way to avoid the threat of treble damages, or even
to reduce overall liability for companies that voluntarily come
clean. Nor, as discussed above, would the fact of the inequitable
conduct itself automatically lead to damages. The patent owner
would still preserve potentially strong arguments regarding causation and damages, and could likely escape with a settlement significantly lower than the possible liability in a treble-damages scenario.
The ACPERA program has been very effective in limiting liability
in antitrust cases and incentivizing private parties to come forward,
but its use has been limited essentially to cartel cases where parties
are faced with a “prisoner’s dilemma” of either cooperating with
the government and admitting to a conspiracy, thereby limiting
182

Pub. L. No. 108-237, tit. II, 118 Stat. 661, 665.
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their own liability, or continuing to operate under the conspiracy
and risking heightened liability.183 In the FCA context, as under
ACPERA, competitors are strongly incentivized to turn in their
competitors. Patent holders, by contrast, are strongly disincentivized from admitting inequitable conduct because it could invalidate a valuable patent. In the pharmaceutical context, the removal
of patent protection can result in immediate generic competition
and a ninety percent reduction in drug prices and, as a consequence, in profits.184 But the fact that ACPERA relies on a prisoner’s-dilemma incentive does not preclude an amnesty program involving monopolists from succeeding. Rather, the likely effect of
such a program would be a race to disclosure in cases where the
proverbial tea leaves make it clear that a finding of inequitable conduct is likely.
Alternatively, the new supplemental examination procedures
created as part of the America Invents Act of 2011 could be used to
rehabilitate patents tainted by inequitable conduct. Prior to the passage of the America Invents Act, inequitable conduct was considered an unfixable injury that was fatal to patent protection. While
other deficiencies in a patent could be cured by reissue or reexamination,185 inequitable conduct could not. Supplemental examination is a new procedure introduced by the America Invents Act. It
is available for all patents and can be instituted if a substantial new
question of patentability is raised by any information relevant to the
patents. Supplemental examination is specifically designed to allow
the USPTO to consider prior art that should have been disclosed
by the patentee during the normal application procedure, removing
183

See Michael W. Scarborough & Dylan I. Ballard, The Case for Eliminating ACPERA’s
Supplemental Cooperation Requirement for Amnesty Applicants, 20 COMPETITION: J. ANTI. &
UNFAIR COMP. L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 34, 35, 43 (2011) (“It has been suggested by some
observers that the amnesty applicant’s ACPERA dilemma–either fail to cooperate and
risk being subjected to heightened civil liability, or attempt to cooperate and risk fatally
undermining one’s case on the merits (and still fail to secure any guarantee of reduced
liability)–does not often obtain in practice because amnesty applicants typically lack
strong defenses on the merits.”).
184
See Benjamin G. Druss et al., Listening To Generic Prozac: Winners, Losers, And
Sideliners, 23 HEALTH AFF. 210, 213–14 (2004).
185
See, e.g., Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1341 n.6
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (curing deficiencies by reissue); Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d
1172, 1182 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (curing deficiencies by reexamination).
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the possibility of inequitable conduct based upon failure to disclose
the prior art. A request for supplemental examination may only be
filed by the patent owner. If the request is granted, the USPTO
may order an ex parte reexamination to address the issues raised.
After supplemental examination, a patent cannot be held unenforceable due to conduct relating to inadequate disclosure during the
prior examination of the patent if that conduct is corrected during
supplemental examination, effectively creating an opportunity for
safe harbor against inequitable conduct that would otherwise render the patent unenforceable.186 However, if the Director of the
USPTO becomes aware that material fraud on the patent office
may have been committed in connection with the patent, the Director must refer the matter to the Attorney General.187 Consequently, supplemental examination may be used to prevent possible liability under the FCA by negating possible claims of inequitable conduct.
CONCLUSION
Amphastar’s novel theory of False Claims Act liability based on
a finding that Aventis engaged in inequitable conduct during the
prosecution of its patent has already made waves among attorneys
in the false-claims bar. The broadening of the FCA over the past
several decades, combined with the recent narrowing of the inequitable conduct doctrine in Therasense, has made Amphastar’s
claim feasible. Furthermore, the legislative and judicial history surrounding the FCA and the doctrine of inequitable conduct suggest
that such liability is proper under the FCA. But the Amphastar litigation is currently stalled in discovery disputes, and whether it will
lead to a new plague of FCA liability for patent holders will not be
known unless and until the suit is resolved in court. If Amphastar
prevails, it will be responsible for dramatically expanding the scope
of FCA liability, affecting both the false-claims attorneys who will
have a new weapon in their arsenal and the patent attorneys who
186

See 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1) (2012); see also Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge,
Toward a System of Invention Registration: The Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH.
L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011) (calling supplemental examination an “amnesty
program”).
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35 U.S.C. § 257(e) (2012).
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may never have encountered the FCA before. In light of the extreme penalty of treble damages for violating the FCA, a large portion of which will likely go directly to a competitor, patentees and
their attorneys would be wise to take proactive steps to limit or
avoid liability under the FCA.

